PROBLEMOS. 1997, vol. 51The annual journal of Vilnius University. Founded in 1968. The articles are published in Lithuanian and other languages. |
The editorial board:
Prof. habil. dr. ANTANAS ANDRIJAUSKAS (VDA), doc. dr. LEONIDAS DONSKIS (KU), prof. habil. dr. ALGIRDAS GAIÞUTIS (KMI), doc. dr. ÈESLOVAS KALENDA (VU, vyr. redaktorius), prof. habil. dr. BRONISLOVAS KUZMICKAS (LFSI), prof. dr. ALGIS MICKËNAS (Ohajo u-tas, JAV), prof. habil. dr. EVALDAS NEKRAÐAS (VU), doc. dr. ZENONAS NORKUS (VU), prof. habil. dr. ROLANDAS PAVILIONIS (VU), prof. habil. dr. ROMANAS PLEÈKAITIS (VU), prof. dr. KÆSTUTIS SKRUPSKELIS (Pietø Karolinos u-tas, JAV), doc. dr. TOMAS SODEIKA (VDU), doc. dr. KRESCENCIJUS STOÐKUS (VU), prof. habil. dr. ARVYDAS ÐLIOGERIS (VU).Contact Address:
Vilniaus universiteto Filosofijos katedra,
Didlaukio 47, 2057 Vilnius; tel. 770706.
ZENONAS NORKUS
Why does modern sociological theory designate itself with two names ("sociological theory" and "social theory")? These synonyms are interpreted in the article as a semantic symptom of the traditionally peculiar relations of sociology with other social sciences and philosophy. Sociology traditionally vacillates between the two definitions of its subject – the minimalist subject (the subject of sociology is a specific phenomena in society) and the maximalist subject (the subject of sociology is the society as a totality). If sociology defines itself as the science of society as a totality, it can take the shape of social theory and submerge itself into the dialectics of the antinomies of sociological reason. These dialectics are analogous to the dialectics of thinking about the world (nature) as a whole, which was brought to light by I. Kant in his "Critique of Pure Reasons." Social theory and philosophy of history are interpreted in the article as "metaphysics of modernity" succeeding traditional metaphysics. A path of the same shape as in the history of "pure metaphysics" before and after Kant can be traced in the histories of social theory and philosophy of history. Following Kant’s example of replacing metaphysics with the transcendental analytic of the naturlist intellect, W. Dilthey proposed the idea of transforming the philosophy of history into the critique of historical reason (critical philosophy of history). T. Parsons’ "The Structure of Social Action" can be interpreted as an attempt to design the critique of sociological reason. All three critiques keep company by assuming a substantive foundationalist concept of science. According to this concept, scientific knowledge is constituted by true, basic, necessary, and substantive (material) principles. This concept was assaulted by the positivist philosophy of science, upholding a formal procedural concept of the scientific method. Postpositivist philosophy of science denies the existence of theoretically neutral empirical knowledge and makes the procedures of the external control of the empirical theories problematic. It opens a logical space for a substantive discussion of the nonempirical assumptions of empirical theories (sociological theories included). The postpositivist philosophy of science as a forum for such a discussion fills in this space. By naming itselt "social theory," contemporary sociological theory reveals its permanent philosophical preoccupation with its foundations and its aspirations to serve as the integrating center for interdisciplinary cooperation of the social sciences. J. Alexander, A. Giddens, J. Habermas, and N. Luhmann are considered the most brilliant representatives of postpositivist social theory. J. Alexander’s "Theoretical Logic in Sociology" is singled out as deserving special attention because, in his attempt to develop postpositivist social theory, he chooses the classical work, (T. Parsons’) "The Structure of Social Action," as his main point of reference in the critique of sociological reason.
RASA ÞIEMYTË
The article is concerned with the problem of intersubjective understanding in the theories of E. Husserl and A. Schütz. While analyzing the meanings of the concept of Lebenswelt in phenomenological philosophy and Schütz’ sociology, the different positions regarding the problem are revealed; therefore, these positions have the same point of departure, an emphatical understanding of Other, which is considered an obstacle for the phenomenological explanation of mutual under-standing. Both conceptions of intersubjectivity, especially Husserl’s, lack the aspect of linguistic communication which would resolve conceptual problems arising in the theories of intersubjective understanding.
NERIJA PUTINAITË
The Natural Standpoint allows for two possible ways of treating the social world: the first, to take it as a finished product for passive investigation, and the second, to take it as a place of action. The chance to overstep the sharp distinction between social observer and social actor is exluded. Schütz’s phenomenological sociology presents the third way, reconciling these two positions. The social world is not merely a finished and (only) observable construction, nor a space of unreflective action. It is continuously in the process of creation, executed by active social observers.
EDMUNDAS KRAKAUSKAS
The mechanical view of this problem is characteristic of rationalists. D. Hume is more original and productive. His philosophical image of man is contradictory, but real. From this point of view, D. Hume and I. Kant are similar and the most interesting thinkers.
VYTIS VALATKA
The conception of Pragmatism, raised by William James, encloses two fundamental components: the pragmatic method of cognition and the pragmatic conception of truth. The pragmatic method affirms that we must investigate only those ideas, conceptions, theories, etc., that can be put to the test of current human experience. The pragmatic conception of truth asserts that ideas, confirmed by the means of the above mentioned experience, must be regarded as true. These true ideas always bear the aspects of might and practical use, in so far as they serve as certain ways to take possession of the world of our external or internal experience. The truth of idea, conception, theory, etc., can not, however, be reduced to its practical utility. A true idea always bears an aspect of correspondence to reality. It either corresponds to the world of our external experience (as the ideas of natural sciences do), or to the world of our internal experience (as metaphysical ideas do).
VALDAS PRUSKUS
The activities and views of Antanas Kaupas (1870–1913), the Lithuanian Catholic sociologist, are analysed in the article. This Catholic intellectual little known to us, residing in the U.S.A., sent his articles and studies to the Lithuanian press in which he tried to ground the idea that the creation of an improved society must be based on common human values and must not contradict natural human rights. On the grounds of works of the U.S.A. psychological direction – sociologists’ ideas, such as A. Ross’, F. Giddings’, L. Ward’s, and A. Kaupas’ – the harmfulness of the total transformation of society under compulsion, ignoring human nature and human rights as well as an absence of social perspectives of it was proved. They mentioned that this transformation was propagated by social radicals. Defending the idea of the evolutionary development of the society, A. Kaupas kept to the view that total welfare may only be reached through a close collaboration of various social groups in which all members of society could be assured of equal rights and possibilities to disclose their abilities and initiative. The main aim of the nation is the restoration and consolidation of Lithuanian independence. For this realization, a concordance of all the layers of society as well as all the political parties is necessary. This can be ensured with tolerance and harmony.
ÈESLOVAS KALENDA
The making of modern ecological enthics, especially its development in the last quarter of the 20th century, is analysed in the article. Main attention is paid to the axialogical problem of how to validate the moral duty of the human being to protect nature: Is the reason for this duty the intrinsic value of nature or human needs and interests? The author suggests that the most theoretically interesting and promising standpoint is defended by A. Leopold, H. Rolston III, V. Hösle, and other investigators, who take as their point of departure the concept of the unity of nature and human beings. They hold that value concepts are an inherent part of the description of nature in scientific ecology. In this way the fatal opposition between fact and value is superseded. This standpoint opens up a new view of nature and expands the range of morally significant beings. These changes in ecological research and the constant rapid growth of ecological ethics during the last decades can apparently be considered as evidence that mankind feels an increasing need for new ecological humanism.
JONAS RUBIKAS
In the development of genetics it is possible to see definite levels of investigation. Every level has its characteristic methodology, which includes a set of methods, a subject of investigation, an evaluation, and an interpretation of the results obtained. The beginning of every level is connected with one or a group of scientists whose work and publications produce the beginning of a new level. The beginners and the levels are as follows: 1) G. Mendel, 1865, "The Cell–The Feature"; 2) T. H. Morgan, 1911, "The Chromosome–The Feature"; 3) O. T. Avery et al., 1944, "The DNA Molecule–The Feature"; and 4) V. Gilbert et al., 1975–1977, "The DNA (RNA) Nucleotide Sequence–The Function." One can notice that a change of levels occurs at almost every 30-year period. We are now in the last third of the fourth level of investigation. When the new level appears, the methodological characteristics that will change the present ones will be impossi-ble to foresee. (In reference to the levels of investigation, see Problemos, Nr. 48, p. 56–66, 1995).
The development of world-wide science (genetics) could be visualized graphically as a line rising upward through many years and levels. With every new discovery new data are located at the top, which prolong the line. The line of scientific development in a country, in an institute, and in a laboratory, or the line of scientific activity of a scientist will continue at the lower position, as a part of the whole; the distance between these two lines is expressed by the magnitude delta– . The small meaning of delta shows that the work, publication, or scientist is near world-wide science; the large meaning of delta shows the high extent of lagging behind present day world science.
The world-wide science line is the background for scientific work evalution: the line goes through levels and at 30-year periods between the levels it goes through the methodological yearly news. If it is important to determine the delta of a work, it is necessary to compare the methodology used in this work with the methodology used according to the world line.
The line of scientific activity of a person is under the influence of multiple factors. The line of the scientists at the beginning of activity (doing candidate or contemporary doctoral dissertation work) goes near and parallel to the world-wide science line. After obtaining a particular degree, a declination of the world line appears with the age and absence of renovation of methodology, if the scientist remains in the laboratory as a working person; this is the natural manner of the delta increase. If a scientist begins an administrative career, honorary titles, degrees, posts, and salaries make the declination marked. The line becomes almost horizontal and the delta increases with scientific progress. There are rare exceptions, i.e., a highly positioned scientist with a small delta.
At present, the high rate delta scientist whose dissertation was made in a high-rate delta laboratory usually appears after obtaining a habilitated doctorate degree or a simple doctorate. It is very dangerous for scientific development when such a high delta habilitated doctor appears in scientific organizational institutions.