ZENONAS NORKUS
The article proposes the survey of the attempts to reconstruct the theoretical core in Weber’s sociological work notorious for its ambiguity in this respect. The work on reconstruction of this core reflects as in the mirror the major shifts in the agenda of contemporary sociology. The confrontation of the system functionalism and conflict sociology during the first post-war decades led to "translation wars" in USA and gave rise to two competing images of Weber - a theorist of social order painted by T. Parsons and as "bourgeois Marx" defended by H. Gerth, C. W. Mills, R. Collins. The renascence of sociological evolutionism in the 1960’s made central the question about the status of Weber’s work on Western rationalism and rationalisation. The two extreme opposing standpoints in this discussion were represented by the vision of Weber as historist (R. Bendix, G. Roth) and as multilinear culturalist evolutionist (F. H. Tenbruck) while W. Schluchter tried to mediate in this conflict seeing Weber’s work as led by "minimalist" evolutionist research program. In all interpretations abovementioned Weber is conceived as a macrosociological theorist whose substantive work stands in tension with his methodological and programmatic texts containing the concept of interpretative sociology, the outline of action theory and avocacy of the methodological individualism. Because of this part of his work Weber was identified (mainly by efforts of A. Schütz) as a progenitor of interpretative sociology too. Coming to prominence in the 1960’s and 1970’s interpretative sociology shifted the focus of theoretical discussion in social theory to the relations between the structure and agency and those between the micro and macro dimensions in social reality. However it was not capable to solve theoretical problems related to those topics. As a new promising theoretical framework for the solution of these problems rational choice approach confronts too the task to come to terms with the work of Max Weber because the history of interpretations of his work teaches us one important lesson: The capability to account for his work providing its assessment and rational reconstruction (if possible in its totality) is an important test of viability for each new approach aspiring for dominance in social theory.
MARIUS POVILAS ÐAULAUSKAS
Could the story of contemporary Lithuania, along with other post-communist countries, be written as a narration on a modern society that abruptly invaded the unexplored realities of the (post-modern) Plastic-Can as contrasted with the (modern) Iron Cage? Is it the intrusion of the Postmodern, which constitutes the main source of problems she today encounters as well as the conceptual key to understand the ongoing transformations of the "unhandy" post-communist habitat? If so, why, given the three traits of the "traditional" post-modern visage, Lithuanian postcommunist experience of the Plastic Can does cover aesthetic and cultural, but fundamentally lack conceptual intimation? And, most importantly, were the postcommunist revolutions determined by the moral-political activity of the Civil Society, including national culturati? Is it true that the postcommunist revolution was unfolded as a direct political activity of the Civil Society acting as a moral-cultural agent and, if so, what does it mean for the conceptual understanding of the postcommunist reality? And, more specifically, given the postmodern vista of moral politics backed by rhe revolutionary role of Civil Society. What is the socio-cultural configuration of the rise and actuality of contemporary Lithuanian habitat?
VALDAS PRUSKUS
Political services to users (electors) are supllied by political organizations and single politicians. In addition to that primary suppliers also suppliers-middlepersons take part in realization of them. They are political agents (functionners of political organizations) and special middlepersons (employees of mass media, advertising and sociological services, politologists whose services are used by political organizations).
In the present article their place and role in supply of political services to users are described. Three level (channel) system of supply of political services is analysed: 1) supply of political services through zero-channel, i.e. through direct link between the producer and the user of the political service; 2) there is one middleperson in the realization channel of political service between the producer and the user of the political service; 3) tho-level channel of realization of a political service which involves the participation of two middlepersons. Avantages and imperfections of the above-mentioned channels of realization of political services are discussed. It is concluded that a political organization must to try to select the channel of supply of political services as correctly as possible after the scrupulous evaluation of all its advantages and imperfections. The more the choice of such channel affects also the total market of political services. Also the price of the political service and the opinion of the users (electors) on the offered political product depends on this choise.
GINTAUTAS MAÞEIKIS
In this article the term "symbol" is defined in the same way as it has been made in neokantianic (E. Cassirer), iconological (E. Panofsky) and Gestalt psychology’s (S. Langer) traditions. So, the symbol is a function of thinking which centres various connotation relations in the act of spontaneous perception and expresses the temporary complex unity of discrete phenomena. The symbol "Mind" as a complex unity of different connotations of sense is analysed. There are various emotional states of our understanding connected with this symbol. These emotional states are analysed there as well. Various Weltanschauungs enable the creation of different symbols (relations of connotations) of rationality and of Mind. Every rationality is supported by cultural organizations and institutions of repressions. Comparing with other civilizations and cultures, the history of New Age of European apprehension of symbol "Mind" can’t be considered as the only type of rationality. So, the principle of epistemological relativism is affirmed in this article. The history of rational epistemology is considered from anthropology point of view of cultural and philosophical anthropology. There are short interpretations of various types of symbol "Mind": "the first cause of movement", "basis of being", "force of salvation", "strenght of harmonizing of cosmos", "creative power of form of thinking", "basis of structure of Ego", "product of connections of neurones", "expression of social and natural relations". K. Popper’s conception of Word 3 is criticized there as well.
AUDRONË ÞUKAUSKAITË
J. Lacan's theory of psychoanalysis is based on the ternary structure of the Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic. The phenomenons of dream, phantasy, and trauma illustrate how these three dimentions are interwoven: phantasy and dream are imaginary constructions which open the Real of desire; trauma is usually considered as a "real event", but its meaning is constituted only as the effect of imaginary and symbolic articulations. This means that the field of psychoanalysis is of discoursive nature: it has the non-necessary and anti-essential character and is always open to future interpretations. These theorethical presuppositions signify that you can never see the face of reality; what is accessible to our apprehension are "the grimaces of the Real".
NERIJUS MILERIUS
The article deals with the problem of the self and the everyday world. In the history of philosophy, the problem of the everydayness has been neglected and rarely met in question, but it is theories of knowledge of the New Ages which have fully excluded the possibility of the refferense to the everydayness.
As axamples of that approach, the notions of the subject and the world in the philosophical theories of R. Descartes, V. G. Leibniz and I. Kant are briefly exposed. It is argued that early L. Wittgenstein transforms the kantian question of the conditions of the possibility of the knowledge into that of the conditions of the possibility of the language, but, at the same time, introduces the notion of the showing which could lead to the understanding of the thinking as attentivity.
It is showed that namely on the base of the attentivity the problems of the self and the everyday world could be conected and mutually described. Finally, it is concluded that despite the permanent philosophical ambition to present the description of the self and the everydayness in the systematical way, the philosophy based on the attentivity sometimes requires the love or some instances of the silence rather than the systematical approasch to the self and to the world.
GODA IZABELË VENSLAUSKAITË
The article presents and overviews the main concepts of "A Theory of Justice" by J. Rawls such as justice, subject of justice, ideas of cooperation and well ordered society, veil of ignorance, rationality of the original situation, principles of justice, the rule of maximum minimorum.
The author presents an analysis of the basic notions of "A Theory of Justice" by evaluating the two aspects of comprehensiveness and avoidance of error. The evaluation of comprehensiveness proceeds along the lines of discussion with some critics of J. Rawls such as Benjamin R. Barber who claims that J. Rawls does not manage to choose between the influence of I. Kant and Th. Hobbes.
The author argues that the theory of justice pre-sen-ted by Rawls satisfies the criteria of coprehen-si-ve-ness by being essentially a Kantian and not a Hobbesian conception. The argument for this is proved by finding essential simmilarities between the Kantian principle of authonomy and the original situation of choice behind the veil of ignorance simulated by Rawls. She argues that the relation between the Kantian and the contractarian point of views signalled by the theory is the problem of different levels of it. "A Theory of Justice" is the one that expresses particullar principles via the contract rather than finds them as an outcome of it.
The second principle of the avoidance of error emerges as an answer to the question wheather J. Rawls’ aim to create a theory of pure procedural justice has been achieved. The answer to this question is ambivalent in the sense that the concept "pure procedural justice" has itself weaker and stronger interpretations. J. Rawls making distinction between procedural and substantial justice says that the difference between them is similar to the one between procedural justice and the justice of results. J. Rawls avoided error in the sense that he deduced the principles of justice defending the human rights of individuals from his Kantian premisses. But the author has doubts wheather Rawls managed to avoid an error in the case if pure procedural justice is unterstood in the stronger (strict Kantian) sense as something a priori deduced from the principles of reason by deliberation.
MARIUS POVILAS ÐAULAUSKAS
The article approaches a complex methodological and conceptual plexus backing the heavily employed concept of Civil Society in the numerous contexts of professional and popular discourses. An author argues for the central distinction between precise, technical (sensu stricto) and rough, popular (grosso modo) usage the term. The professional sensu stricto usage of the concept unfolds and could be as such identified only on the diachronic and synchronous background of different theoretical contexts that were articulated in the millennial history of ever controversial Western philosophical discourse. The horizon of its possible meaning is extremely differentiated and connot be summarized in an all-embracing universaly valid meaning. The laic grosso modo usage of the notion, in contrast, is included in a variety of political, cultural and other column-type popular vocabularies. Here the cluster of meanings attached to the notion Civil Society accords to the synchronous patterns of contextualization and, although altogether deprived of deliberate methodological backing and conceptual clarity, it could be roughly identified in terms of loosely defined finite list of connotations at any given momentum of time. An heuristically sound approximating definition of the Civil Society sensu stricto that is nevertheless required in a consistent empirically backed societal analysis cannot claim universal validity and must be posited only instrumentally. An example of such an instrumental concept of Civil Society which by itself falls within the class of sensu stricto connotations of the term is also offered.
JONAS RUBIKAS
Genome is the whole genetic information of the cell including nuclear, mitochondrial, plastid and other DNA or RNA elements. However, what is the relation between the human cell genome and the genome of total human organism, human personality? Is the genome absolute constant or does the genome change during life, development and evolution of the organism? What is strategy of the genome, and what are the changes, the tactics of the genome seeking to achieve the strategic aim? Is there any difference between human genome and genome for human?
Genome controls directly or indirectly all human functions: body structure, physiology. Human mental and consciousness activity, brain functions obtained by learning mask the dependence of these activities on the genome. Even belief in various forms of trascendental phenomena, reincarnation, astral energy influence, energy materialization and many others completely depends on the believer’s genome. Evidence of that is the damage to mental functions in various disorders of genome.
The strategy of the genome is multiplication. This is clearly seen when the comparison between the information content (the gene number) and the life cycle of small genomes (plasmids, viruses, singlecellular prokaryotic organisms) is made: large space is occupied by information on replication enzymes and the sequence of replication origin. In higher eukaryotic multicellular organisms the increased complexity of the genome could be expressed as plus function information: for metabolism, for relations with environment, for nervous system. The information can be grouped into special large and smaller programs: for growth, for multiplication, for differentiation and for apoptosis. All these functions again are directed at organism multiplication.
In higher multicellular organisms the whole organism genome is stored in special cells - gamets. This genome could be called a strategic genome used only for beginning of a new organism. Every cell of organism has the same genome, but active are only particular program genes, specific for the cell destination; this is a tactic genome.
The way of genetic information expression is: DNA-RNA-protein. The accuracy of these three-step processes is under the end-product selection control. For better realization of information in some cases the genome changes the usual way of expression, that is, the genome uses some tactical approaches: at the DNA level - restructuring of the genome (mating type in yeasts, sex determination in some flies and worms, V(D)J recombination in immunoglobulin genes in human B lymphocytes); at the RNA level - gene splicing, alternative and self splicing, RNA editing; at the protein level - protein splicing.
Human beings as all living Nature obey the bible trinity law: we are not only parents but also offsprins at the same time, we are joined to each other by the eternal renovation power - the GENOME.
JURIJUS RADOVIÈIUS
Postmodernist philosophy dissolves the concept of objective reality and by this also the concept of objective ethical obligation. Parmenides introducted an absolute difference between outer world and transcendent ideal being. This methods of an absolute formal logical negation was repeated by Epicuros in his discrimination between "we" and "death". Both object and subject as well as verges between them are flexible and may be subjective. The only absolute and objective difference is the opposition between our existence and non-existence. Formal logical negation along with the whole science was possible only thanks to biological death’s absoluteness. Being is not simply copula in judgement, as I. Kant thought, it is an autonomous logical projection of our own objective being or non-being. It is in this way being is a value and "ought" follows from "is".
ÈESLOVAS KALENDA
The article developes an idea that the ecological situation of Earth’s inhabitants depends on the ambivalent contents of the man’s relationship with nature. Both pro-nature and anti-nature trends objectively emerge in this relationship in an open or hidden form, and the specific shape of their correlation determines the current condition of the "nature-society" system. It is the specific feature of the civilized mankind’s existence that its survival is determined not by the fight against nature - as it had been in the paleolite era - but rather by a peaceful coexistence of socium and nature.
